Are Predictions About Climate Change To Pessimistic?

Abstract

The use of emotion in climate change appeals is a hotly debated topic. Warning virtually the perils of imminent mass extinction, climatic change communicators are oftentimes accused of being unnecessarily 'doomsday' in their attempts to foster a sense of urgency and activeness among the public. Pessimistic messaging, the thinking goes, undermines engagement efforts, straining credulity and fostering a sense of helplessness, rather than concern. Widespread calls for more optimistic climate change messaging punctuate public discourse. This inquiry puts these claims to the test, investigating how affective endings (optimistic vs. pessimistic vs. fatalistic) of climate change appeals impact individual hazard perception and outcome efficacy (i.e., the sense that i's beliefs matters). The findings of three online experiments presented in this paper advise that climatic change appeals with pessimistic affective endings increase risk perception (Studies ane and 2) and outcome efficacy (Study 3), which is the result of heightened emotional arousal (Studies 1–three). Moreover, the results signal that the mediating effect of emotional arousal is more than prevalent amid political moderates and conservatives, as well as those who hold either individualistic or hierarchical world views. Given that these audiences mostly exhibit lower chance perception and outcome efficacy in relation to climate alter, the results suggest that climate change appeals with pessimistic endings could trigger higher engagement with the issue than optimistic endings. These findings are interpreted in calorie-free of recent research findings, which propose that differences in threat-reactivity and emotional arousal may exist owing to brain functions/beefcake mappable to basic motivations for safety and survival. Implications for scholars and practitioners are discussed.

"I don't want your hope. I want you to panic. I desire you to experience the fear I do. Every day. And want you to act. I want yous to behave similar our house is on burn down. Because information technology is."

–Greta Thunberg (World Economic Forum'south Annual Coming together in Davos, 2019)

Introduction

Should climate change appeals take optimistic or pessimistic endings? On the one paw, pessimistic messaging, ofttimes characterized as "climate disaster porn," may be equally harmful to appointment efforts every bit outright denial (Isle of mann et al., 2017) if it fosters paralysis rather than action (Freedman, 2017). On the other hand, though optimistic messaging may comfort a public suffering from chronic 'apocalypse fatigue' (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2009), information technology might not spark the melancholia engagement critical for triggering risk perception (Slovic et al., 2004).

Affect is a powerful lever that can cause us to exist overly sensitive to small-scale changes in the environment while distracting us from large shifts of much greater consequence (Slovic et al., 2004). It can prompt irrational levels of alarm regarding threats with low levels of likelihood (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001), and deluded levels of optimism in the face up of potentially catastrophic consequences (Sharot, 2011). In the context of climatic change, positive affect leads to avoidance of new information, which could potentially crusade distress, whereas negative affect has the contrary consequence (Yang and Kahlor, 2013). In take a chance management, negative affect is widely acknowledged every bit the "wellspring of action" (Peters and Slovic, 2000), and this has shown to be no less true for the threat of climate alter (Schwartz and Loewenstein, 2017). Such prove diverges from findings in the field of wellness communication, where positive bear upon encourages information-seeking (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995; Yang et al., 2011). One plausible caption for this inverse consequence is perceived efficacy, an important predictor of engagement with climate change (Feldman and Hart, 2015; Kellstedt et al., 2008). In other words, people are less likely to accept action when they feel overwhelmed or hopeless (Bandura, 2002; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Mayer and Smith, 2019).

Negative bear upon has been shown to increment estimations of adventure probability while positive affect reduces them (Finucane et al., 2000; Ganzach, 2000). In line with the principle of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), negative touch is more likely to be associated with loss rather than gain frames. A number of studies show that sadness (Schwartz and Loewenstein, 2017), worry (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014), fear (Feldman and Hart, 2015), anxiety (Weber, 2006), hope, and anger (Feldman and Hart, 2015) are strongly associated with climate change engagement, while others observe no association with anger or fearfulness (Smith and Leiserowitz, 2014). Witte and Allen (2000) find that fear appeals are ineffective when perceived efficacy is low. Moreover, negative affect can exist considered a form of cognitive discomfort, and as the summit end rule illustrates (Do et al., 2008), people are willing to choose situations with objectively more overall pain as long as the event ends with relatively less hurting. For this reason, we focus on how valence at the end of a climate change appeal influences a receiver's risk perception of climate change-related consequences, and their perceived outcome efficacy.

The cess of risk is subjective and inextricably linked to judgments made on the basis of core values; people tend to subconsciously avoid and mistrust data that threatens their identity or values, or which has the potential to cause estrangement from social in-groups (Kahan, 2015). Belief in anthropogenic climate change is associated with liberal credo (McCright et al., 2016) because the acknowledgment that human activity is influencing the climate implies a demand for regulation. Beyond political beliefs, cultural cognition theory stipulates that core values shape information processing and risk assessment along ii dimensions or cultural worldviews: 'group' and 'grid' (Kahan and Braman, 2006). Research suggests that group/grid cultural worldviews predict beliefs about climate change improve than any other individual characteristic (Kahan et al., 2011). The 'group' dimension categorizes people as either 'individualists' or 'communitarians' based on their beliefs about how strongly people are jump to other members of order. The 'grid' dimension describes values near the degree to which an private believes their choices are controlled and limited by their roles within society.

In this paper, we brand 2 propositions. First, the affective ending (i.e., optimistic vs. pessimistic) of climate modify appeals impacts people's run a risk perception and perceived consequence efficacy, which is mediated through emotional arousal. We propose that climate alter appeals with pessimistic endings positively influence climate alter hazard perception and outcome efficacy because they enhance emotional arousal. Second, the forcefulness of the proposed mediated human relationship is attenuated past the values of a bulletin receiver. Nosotros predict a less pronounced effect for those with liberal ideology, including those property communitarian or egalitarian worldviews, than for conservatives and those holding individualist or hierarchical worldviews.

Beyond 3 experiments, we provide support for our propositions. In Study i, we exam the mediating role of emotional arousal on the impact of a climate change text with an optimistic vs. pessimistic ending on risk perception. Information technology is of import to annotation that we practise not equate negative valence with fatalism. The pessimistic catastrophe still presents the possibility of turning things around. Further, we examination the moderating role of political credo. In Report 2, we successfully replicate Report one by using a video stimulus combined with text, increasing the ecological validity of our findings. We too test the moderating role of message receiver values by adding a more nuanced measure of ideological commitments: cultural worldviews (Kahan et al., 2009), in addition to political ideology. Finally, in Written report 3, using a nationally representative sample of the U.S. population, we add a fatalistic condition and introduce outcome efficacy as a dependent measure.

Written report i: The influence of melancholia catastrophe (optimistic vs. pessimistic) on emotional arousal and perception of climate change risk—written stimuli

Experimental design

In Study 1, participants were presented with a climate change text that had either an optimistic or pessimistic ending. In a unmarried-factor (melancholia ending: optimistic (N = 101) vs. pessimistic (North = 99)) between-subjects online experiment (N = 200 U.S.-based residents were recruited through Mturk (35.five% females, M _age = 34.6, SD_{historic period} = 10.4) for a compensation of USD ane.20. Sample size was adamant beforehand (Simmons et al., 2011) with the goal of having at least 100 participants in each condition. After providing informed consent and demographic background information, participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition. The two written stimuli were derived from an adaptation of the transcript and photos of a climate change video, differing only in the valence of their endings (see Supplementary Information, Appendix A).

Qualified participants were asked to assess climate alter chance using the item, "How much risk practise you believe global warming poses to human wellness, rubber, or prosperity?" (Kahan, 2017) on an viii-signal Likert scale with anchors from 0 = "none at all" to 7 = "extremely high risk" (M = 5.42, SD = 1.89). To gauge emotional arousal, we adapted a measure from Salgado and Kingo (2017) using the item, "How emotionally intense was it for y'all to read this article?", on a 7-point calibration with anchors from 1 = "minimal emotional intensity" to vii ="maximal emotional intensity" (M = 4.10, SD = ane.58). In a manipulation cheque, participants were asked to rate whether the entreatment ended on a positive or negative note (optimistic: Yard = 4.63, SD = i.49; pessimistic: M = ane.92, SD = 1.04; t(198) = fourteen.94, p < 0.000). Finally, participant political ideology was assessed (47.0% liberals, 30.5% moderates, 22.5% conservatives), every bit well as additional items outside of the focus of this study.

Results

Consistent with our expectations, participants in the pessimistic condition reported greater take chances perception (M = five.66, SD = one.79) than those in the optimistic status (Thousand = v.xx, SE = i.97; Isle of mann–Whitney U = 4244, p = 0.055). Moreover, participants in the pessimistic status reported college emotional arousal (M = 4.44, SD = 1.57) than those in the optimistic status (Thou = 3.75, SD = 1.53; t(198) = −3.17, p = 0.002). A linear regression modelling take chances perception further revealed a significant positive relationship with emotional arousal (β = 0.48, SE = 0.08, p < 0.001, R ² = 0.16). These findings suggest a possible mediating role of emotional arousal on the relationship between affective ending and risk perception, a suggestion we tested with conditional process analysis using the PROCESS three.ane macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), decision-making for historic period and gender. The analysis (Model 4; 10,000 bootstrap samples) revealed a pregnant indirect effect (ab = 0.31, SE = 0.12; 95% CI: 0.ten, 0.56). Finally, we tested the moderating effect of political ideology, following a similar modeling approach (Model fourteen; 10,000 bootstrap samples; Tabular array 1). The chastened mediation index for political moderates was not significant (ab = 0.23, SE = 0.16; 95% CI: −0.06, 0.57), whereas the moderated mediation index for conservatives was significant (ab = 0.31, SE = 0.20; 95% CI: 0.01, 0.77). An exam of the conditional indirect effects at different levels of the moderator (Fig. 1a) revealed that at lower levels of emotional arousal, risk perception is significantly lower for participants with conservative political ideology.

Tabular array 1 Results of conditional procedure analysis (moderated mediation model), Studies 1 and 2.

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Fig. 1: Interaction effects.

Graph (a): Study 1, interaction betwixt risk perception and emotional arousal across moderator levels (political credo: liberal, moderate, conservative). Graph (b): Written report 2, interaction between risk perception and emotional arousal beyond moderator levels (political ideology: liberal, moderate, bourgeois). Graph (c): Written report 3, interaction between risk perception and emotional arousal across moderator levels (Group cultural worldviews: individualists, communitarians). Graph (d): Study three, interaction betwixt chance perception and emotional arousal across moderator (Filigree cultural worldviews: hierarchical, egalitarian).

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Study two: The influence of melancholia ending (optimistic vs. pessimistic) on emotional arousal and perception of climate change risk—video stimuli

Experimental design

In a single gene (affective ending: optimistic (N = 228) vs. pessimistic (North = 221)) between-subjects online experiment, 449 U.S.-based residents were recruited through Mturk (49.9% females, M _age = 39.8, SD_{historic period} = 12.iii) and compensated with USD 1.xx. Sample size was determined beforehand with the goal of increasing the likelihood of recruiting participants with ideologically various political and cultural worldviews. The protocol was similar to Study 1 with the following exceptions: (i) stimuli included the actual video from which transcripts were adapted for written report 1; (2) the two video stimuli were identical except for the final 6 s that were professionally edited: the original video ended with positive valence, and the adjusted version ended with negative valence; and (iii) afterward viewing the video, participants were asked to read the last ii written entreatment segments used in Study 1.

The statement assessing emotional arousal was adapted to the medium, and read, "how emotionally intense was it for you to watch this video?" Iii measures of message receiver values were employed: (a) political ideology (39.9% liberals, 25.4% moderates, 34.seven% conservatives); (b) group worldviews (individualism vs. communitarianism; M = 3.68, SD = 1.05); and (c) grid worldviews (hierarchy vs. egalitarianism; Thou = 2.78, SD = 1.40). The ii dimensions of cultural worldviews were assessed using the short-grade of the cultural worldview scale (Kahan et al., 2010) (meet Supplementary Information, Appendix B). Finally, in a manipulation cheque, participants were asked to rate whether the appeal ended on a positive or negative notation (optimistic: M = 4.84, SD = ane.41; pessimistic: M = ii.53, SD = ane.33, t(447) = 17.85, p < 0.000).

Results

Consistent with our expectations, participants in the pessimistic status reported greater take chances perception (M = 5.56, SD = ane.53) than those in the optimistic condition (Thousand = 5.17, SD = i.83; Mann–Whitney U = 22329, p = 0.032). More than, participants in the pessimistic condition reported higher emotional arousal (M = iv.49, SD = i.57) than those in the optimistic condition (One thousand = 4.02, SD = 1.67; t(447) = −3.08, p = 0.002). A linear regression modelling adventure perception farther revealed a significant positive relationship with emotional arousal (β = 0.54, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001; R ² of 0.27). Following an belittling approach similar to Study ane, nosotros tested the mediating effect of emotional arousal. The analysis revealed a significant indirect result (ab = 0.25, SE = 0.08; CI = 0.09, 0.41). Finally, we tested the moderating furnishings of political ideology, grouping, and grid cultural worldviews. All chastened mediation indices were significant (Table 1). An examination of the conditional indirect furnishings at different levels of the moderators (Fig. 1b–d) revealed that at lower levels of emotional arousal, risk perception is significantly lower for moderates and conservatives, too as for lower levels of group and grid values (i.e., communitarians and egalitarians, respectively).

Give-and-take: Studies i and 2

The results of the first two studies provide support for our proposition that climate change appeals with a pessimistic ending trigger emotional arousal, which in plough influences perceptions of climate change risk. Moreover, the influence of emotional arousal on chance perception differs across people with varying political ideologies and cultural worldviews. The greatest differences are observed among conservatives and people holding individualist or hierarchical worldviews, who report higher levels of business about climatic change when presented with a pessimistic climate change appeal.

Written report 3: the influence of affective ending (optimistic vs. pessimistic vs. fatalistic) on emotional arousal, climate change take a chance perception, and consequence efficacy

Experimental design

In Studies ane and 2, we tested the two poles of affective catastrophe (optimistic vs. pessimistic). Prior work suggests that people are more than receptive to information when both threat appraisal and result efficacy are high (Witte and Allen, 2000). People might be scared into perceiving risk, but how does this influence the sense that their own actions matter for solving the challenge of climate change? Thus, in Study three, we added a third condition to test the deviation between negative affective valence arising from pessimistic messaging with the possibility of a hopeful outcome (pessimistic status) versus fatalistic messaging suggesting that it is likewise tardily to plough things effectually (fatalistic status). Moreover, we introduced perceived event efficacy equally a dependent measure to exam the suggestion that both negative atmospheric condition would outperform positive valence for sparking emotional arousal, motivating a stronger sense of agency and influence on outcomes related to climatic change. Finally, we used a nationally representative sample of the U.S. population to increment the external validity of our findings.

In a single factor, between-subjects online experiment, 1115 U.s.a.-based residents (54.three% females; M _{historic period} = 49.8, SD_age = 16.8) were recruited through a nationally representative panel. Sample size was determined beforehand. The protocol and measures were similar to the two previous studies with the following exceptions: (i) in addition to optimistic (N = 375) and pessimistic (N = 375) weather condition, a fatalistic condition was added (North = 365) (Supplementary Information, Appendix C); (2) the main dependent variable, effect efficacy, was operationalized using a single item, "I believe my deportment have an influence on climate change" adapted from Kellstedt et al. (2008), and measured on a four-point calibration with anchors 1 ="strongly disagree" to 4 ="strongly agree") (M = 2.91, SD = 0.99); and (c) the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale was included to measure trait efficacy³⁵ consisting of x items measured on a 4-signal scale with anchors 1 ="not at all true" to 4 ="exactly true") (G = 3.18, SD = 0.48; α = 0.xc). The aforementioned message receiver values were employed as in Study two: (a) political ideology (31.6% liberals, 35.2% moderates, 33.3% conservatives) (b) group cultural worldviews (individualism vs. communitarianism; M = 4.05, SD = 1.14), and (c) filigree cultural worldviews (hierarchy vs. egalitarianism; Grand = 3.05, SD = 1.threescore). Finally, in a manipulation cheque, participants were asked to charge per unit whether the appeal ended on a positive or negative note (F(ii,1112) = lxx.63, p < 0.001). Mail hoc comparisons using Tukey'southward HSD test revealed that the optimistic condition was rated equally more positive (One thousand = iv.52, SD = 1.66) than the pessimistic ending status (M = 3.36, SD = one.92, p < 0.001), with the latter being more than positive than the fatalistic condition (M = 2.98, SD = i.93, p = 0.014).

Results

We did not detect any pregnant difference in outcome efficacy beyond the three conditions (F(2,1112) = 0.27, p = 0.761), still, we did observe meaning differences in emotional arousal, (F(2,1112) = 8.34, p < 0.001). Post hoc comparisons using Tukey's HSD test revealed that participants in the pessimistic status reported higher emotional arousal (M = 3.69, SD = 1.84) than those in the optimistic condition (K = 3.22, SD = 1.89; p < 0.001). However, there was no meaning difference betwixt the pessimistic and fatalistic conditions (M = 3.74, SD = 1.99; p = 0.920). A linear regression with event efficacy as the dependent variable further revealed a significant positive association with emotional arousal (β = 0.22, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001; R ⁱⁱ of 0.18).

Next, we tested the mediating result of emotional arousal on the relationship between melancholia catastrophe and result efficacy, using provisional process assay controlling for historic period, gender, and trait efficacy. Assay revealed significant indirect effects for the pessimistic (ab = 0.09, SE = 0.03; 95% CI: 0.03, 0.fifteen), and fatalistic atmospheric condition (ab = 0.x, SE = 0.03; 95% CI: 0.05, 0.17). We and so tested the moderating role of core values, operationalized equally political ideology, group-, and filigree cultural worldviews. All tested moderated arbitration indices were meaning (Table ii). An examination of the provisional indirect effects at unlike levels of the moderators (Fig. 2) revealed that perceived event efficacy is lower at lower levels of emotional arousal for all groups, just the upshot is particularly pronounced for moderates and conservatives, every bit well as for those with lower levels of group and grid values (i.eastward., communitarians and egalitarians).

Table 2 Results of conditional procedure analysis (moderated mediation model), Study three.

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Fig. ii

Interaction furnishings between risk perception and emotional arousal across groups of moderators.

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Give-and-take: Study 3

The results of Study 3 successfully replicate the findings of the two previous studies with a different dependent variable: event efficacy. As in Studies 1 and 2, the divergence in outcome efficacy as a result of increased emotional arousal was significantly greater in groups most likely to be disengaged with the issue, namely moderates and conservatives, and those holding communitarian and egalitarian cultural worldviews (Figs. 2 and 3).

Fig. 3

Violin plots of experienced emotional arousal past condition and political ideology, Studies 1–iii. Black dots represent means; error bars bespeak standard errors.

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General discussion

Our findings suggest that the affective ending of climate modify appeals influences date. Pessimistic endings yield higher take a chance perception via heightened emotional arousal, and though this held truthful for all audiences, the furnishings are specially pronounced in individuals usually exhibiting low-levels of concern about climate change (i.eastward., moderates, conservatives, and those holding individualistic or hierarchical worldviews). Optimistic endings may comfort a public suffering from apocalypse fatigue, but do not appear to increase risk perception and perceived result efficacy. These findings are in line with recent experimental work finding that cardiac activity indicative of emotional arousal predicts behavioral appointment with climate modify (Morris et al., 2019). In contrast to work positing that "fright appeals" may hinder efficacy (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009), our results also suggest that pessimistic endings actually increment people's belief that their own private behavior matters for climatic change, even in the face of fatalistic messaging, though at that place are differences across ideologically diverse groups.

Research from the fields of neuroscience and social psychology offers plausible explanations for why conservatives might exist more than threat-reactive in the face of emotional arousal than liberals. While the formation and processing of emotion involve complex neural connectivity, there is evidence for the lateralization (asymmetrical representation) of brain office Lane and Nadel (2002). Liberalism has been associated with increased greyness matter book in the inductive cingulate cortex, an area of the brain associated with emotion regulation and executive role, which allows for greater cognitive flexibility (Kanai et al., 2011). Conservativism, on the other hand, has been associated with increased volume in the correct hemisphere of the amygdala (Amodio et al., 2007; Kanai et al., 2011), an area which exerts greater influence on the processing of primary emotions such equally fear, also as emotional expression than the left hemisphere. These differences in brain functions/beefcake may exist mappable to basic motivations for safe and survival and explain the association between political credo and threat reactivity (Lilienfeld and Latzman, 2014; Pedersen et al., 2018). Napier et al. (2018) found, for example, that Republicans took significantly more liberal positions on social issues after envisioning feeling completely and totally physically prophylactic, while Nail et al. (2009) found that dispositional liberals took on considerably more conservative positions in the face of arrangement-injustice and mortality salience threats.

These findings affirm the disquisitional role of negative affect as a powerful lever for heightening perception of climatic change run a risk but require farther investigation. Climate change scholars, communicators, and policymakers should examination segmentation strategies to assess the optimal degree of negativity in messaging designed for ideologically—and culturally diverse audiences. Given that public engagement with climate change is low in the U.s. (Leiserowitz et al., 2017), and even in Europe, very few people feel a sense of personal responsibility for its effects (European Committee, 2014), 1 possible remedy could be to tailor the affective ending of climate change appeals.

What are the long-term effects of various melancholia combinations on adventure perception and efficacy, and do these effects persist over time? Exercise these vary beyond cultures? At what indicate might the use of negative bear on backlash every bit a result of desensitization? These are important questions worth exploring in hereafter work.

Ethics statement

The work was carried out in accordance with the Helsinki Announcement, taking every precaution to protect the privacy and interests of human participants, all of whom gave written, informed consent.

Information availability

The datasets for the iii studies analyzed in this manuscript have been registered with the Open Science Framework. Complete stimulus materials are available in the Supplementary Information, and data can be accessed with permission from Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/bvqat/?view_only=455db4ac6b744393920a1e056ddac8d1.

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Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank David Salvesen and the University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill for sharing so generously from NC Climate Stories, from which our experimental stimuli were created. Thanks also to Jacob D. Christensen and Jacob L. Orquin for their helpful comments throughout this piece of work. We are also enormously grateful for the support this research has received in the class of seed funding from the Interacting Minds Centre, Aarhus University, also equally the Aarhus University Research Foundation.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Management, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

   Brandi S. Morris, Polymeros Chrysochou, Simon T. Karg & Panagiotis Mitkidis

2. Ehrenberg-Bass Institute, UniSA Concern, University of Southward Commonwealth of australia, Adelaide, Australia

   Polymeros Chrysochou

3. Social Science Enquiry Institute, Duke Academy, Duke, USA

   Panagiotis Mitkidis

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Correspondence to Brandi S. Morris.

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Morris, B.S., Chrysochou, P., Karg, S.T. et al. Optimistic vs. pessimistic endings in climatic change appeals. Humanit Soc Sci Commun seven, 82 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00574-z

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• Received: 15 December 2019

• Accepted: 12 Baronial 2020

• Published: 03 September 2020

• DOI : https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00574-z

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